+44-7897-074717Research Article - Journal of Research in International Business and Management ( 2024) Volume 11, Issue 3
Received: 07-Jun-2024, Manuscript No. 138489; Editor assigned: 12-Jun-2024, Pre QC No. 138489; Reviewed: 20-Jun-2024, QC No. 138489; Revised: 26-Jun-2024, Manuscript No. 138489; Published: 29-Jun-2024, DOI: 10.14303//jribm.2024.030
The paper explored the difficulties being confronted with in the Lagos State Public Procurement law implementation. Both primary and secondary sources of data were used in this work; information was gathered by sending questionnaires to the designated respondents. There were 1398 employees in the study population who worked for the chosen ministries, agencies, contractors, and civil society organizations. A proportionate random selection procedure was employed to pick 210 respondents, or 15% of the research population, for the sample size. Secondary data were gathered from books, scholarly journals, LSPPA official documents, and the internet. The acquired data were analyzed using the mean, frequency, and percentage. The study's conclusion showed that, of the ten acknowledged challenges, the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency's (LSPPA) challenges related to the state's public procurement law implementation were largely insignificant. These challenges included poor ethical standards (58.9%, x?=2.5), a lack of manpower (72.2%), and delays in the adjudication of contract malpractices (65.8%, x?=2.1).
However, the report also demonstrated the difficulties that the LSPPA faced in putting the state's public procurement statute into effect; such as: interference from political office holders (67.4, x?=2.9), ineffective oversight function posed as a challenge (63.9%, x?=2.6), delay in the release of appropriated budget (57.4%, x?=2.7), political will and commitment to prosecute offenders (54.5, x?=2.7), sharp practices in the award of contract (65.8%, x?=2.8), politicised civil society organisation (78.2%, x?=3.0), and submission of procurement plan (60.9%, x?=2.8) substantially hampers LSPPA in the quest to achieve efficiency, probity, openness, value for money, accountability, and fair pricing amongst others. As a result, the study comes to the conclusion that the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency, or LSPPA, faces significant obstacles in implementing state procurement legislation, which slows down the state's procurement law's policy objectives. It was further demonstrated by the confirmation of seven claims as opposed to three claims that, in turn, refuted it.
Every economy's degree of development and expansion reveals how its public procurement strategy functions, whether momentously or not. Following the payment of wages and salaries, which constitute ongoing government expenses in any economy, the public procurement sector of that economy bears the heavy burden of capital spending. By investing in public procurement, this is done to promote growth and development, which has a knock-on effect on all facets of human endeavors. Therefore, it is sufficient to state that government spending on social overhead such as public facilities is not wasteful because investors would only allocate their funds to directly productive endeavors that promote development and progress. These are all essential components of propelling a nation's development in order to attain the targeted levels of human and infrastructure development, among other things (Adeyeye, 2011).
Public procurement is the main component of public expenditure in both developed economies in the West and the East. This is done to generate the necessary development that leads to value for money, transparency, efficiency, accountability, and openness, among other benefits. These all stand for the essence of public procurement, which helps taxpayers fulfill their constitutional obligations by providing them with indirect advantages. Due to the nature of public procurement in a developing nation like Nigeria, the agency in charge of coordinating public procurement must be screened to guarantee value for money and budgetary allocation for such. This serves as the main function of the Bureau of Public Procurement for the federal government and its counterpart in Lagos State, the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency; funds are used for the purposes for which they were released. This is done to ensure that there is no diversion of funds, non-compliance with the appropriate provisions on the procurement Act, Law, as it applies, or inflated prices, among other things.
Statement of the Research Problem
Lagos State's public procurement law was undoubtedly enacted in response to the pressing need to curb the reckless spending of government ministries, departments, and agencies in order to ensure that the funds authorized and expended were worth their money. Lagos State Public Procurement Law with constitutional provision for Lagos State Public Procurement Agency LSPPA's establishment was brought about by the enactment of public procurement policy to appropriately unravel the challenges related to the State's procurement process and contract award.
The law was passed in order to address the issues of unethical public procurement practices that plagued the public sector and turned into a conduit for money laundering and the embezzlement of public funds. Nevertheless, despite the passage of public procurement legislation, the industry still sees harsh practices because of an excessive amount of control over the LSPPA's functions and authority, which is shown in the high rate of project abandonment and subpar project execution (Bolton, 2006). This is related to the degree of political influence within the organisation, which is responsible for enforcing the law's requirements (LSPPA). For this reason, it is necessary to examine the obstacles Lagos State Public Procurement Agency faces while putting public procurement policy into practice.
Limitations in Lagos's Public Procurement Policy Implementation Bargained Benchmark
One problem is that political affiliations can taint benchmarks or set price standards, which can result in the blatant awarding of public contracts at greatly inflated costs and combined with unappropriated spending. Section 54 of the Lagos State Public Procurement Law, 2011 states that the public procurement law lays out procedures for contract awarding with the goal of reducing or curbing inflated costs, which frequently result in a contract that is awarded with less value for the money and saves government fortunes that would have been lost to contract inflation. Additionally, the flagrant misbehavior on the benchmark standard that an audited account would have exposed is being sacrificed on the altar of political expediency, impeding accountability and transparency; annual budget was passed late. Furthermore, the nation's public procurement strategy has continued to suffer from the yearly budget's tardy passage. The late passing of the yearly budget has had a negative impact on the early passage of the budgets and the subsequent availability of funds for the implementation of various ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) procurement via budgets. Furthermore, as most of the items on the annual budget are frequently not supported in the National or State Assembly during the budget justification of each MDA, the lack of openness in the budget planning process also contributes to late passage. Certain public procurement policies cannot be executed without sufficient funding, and this has remained a persistent difficulty in the implementation of public procurement policy. Besides, the primary issue of the budget's stated drop in income predictions occasionally results in non-conformity with grundnorm, which eventually hinders the execution of public procurement policy (Walker & Brammer, 2009).The severe violations of the constitution, particularly the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA 2007), which among other things demands, frequently lead to the yearly budget being passed later than expected. the release of MDAs' audited financial statements so that stakeholders can review how previously appropriated funds were used and ensure value for money, as required by FRA 2007 section (4), which is frequently broken.
Leadership in Government and Institutionalized Procedures
The country's leadership orientation greatly affects how public procurement policy is carried out. There is a greater emphasis on government operations on adherence to the implementation of public procurement policies, which alters the institutionalized process. Because both the federal and state governments have disregarded the provisions of procurement laws, the federal government has declined to form the National Council on Public Procurement, and Lagos State has failed to do the same for the Governing Board of the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency. The law upholds the necessity of enhancing effectiveness, encouraging good governance, and guaranteeing openness in the contract awarding process via adherence to laws that are customarily in most part of the world. The management approach of the organizations tasked with carrying out public procurement policy makes them viable. Without any intervention, the NCPP, LSPPGB, and other contractors, suppliers, and service providers provided chances for the tendering process. According to Oguonu (2013), the government leadership would determine how fairly or unfairly any violations found during the bidding process would be addressed. Fair treatment would result from the promotion of the rule of law; otherwise, many contracts might be granted without giving open competitive bidding the consideration it deserves, as stated in the (Snider & Randon, 2008). The implementation of public procurement policy was thus severely hampered by the leadership of the government.
Inadequate Evaluation of Technical and Professional Competencies
According to Onuorah and Appah (2007), a subpar screening procedure for contract, supply, or service award is frequently reflected in the subpar execution of such contracts, supplies, or services. Poor screening results in poor project implementation or the use of subpar materials, which eventually affects the projects' long-term viability. By awarding contracts in a shoddy manner, suppliers, contractors, or service providers fail to validate their technical and professional capability, which has an impact on implementation. Due to interferences, the BPP or LSPPA may have conducted a subpar screening exercise, which could result in inefficiencies and a lack of value for the money, both of which are common causes of non-transparent processes.
Interferences from politics
Political meddling, according to Arrowsmith and Quinot (2013), has persisted in having negative consequences on Nigeria's public procurement policy's implementation. The heads of departments, ministries, or agencies frequently meddle with the execution of public procurement policies. In order to guarantee that their friends and political allies profit from contracts, supplies, or services rendered, heads of ministries frequently control what happens within their own ministries (Adewole, 2014). Political meddling has had a role in the nation's growth and development since it has resulted in the acquisition of several contracts, supplies, and services, along with their associated consequences. Matthew (2005) contends that inadequate execution of certain projects or programs, for which funding is allocated, frequently results in diversion of funds or subpar execution. The PPA (2007) and its domesticated LSPPL parts, which require a stakeholder to indicate whether they are interested in bidding on any contracts, are of concern to the head of these MDAs. Here, we frequently hear about budget padding, which is a serious form of meddling that national or local governments engage in. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid treating information unfairly, since this could offer certain contractors, suppliers, or consulting firms an advantage over others. This often results in a tense relationship between the ministry and parastatal, which is being jeopardized by political considerations.
Theoretical Framework
The study was centered on the concept of agency. The symbiotic interaction between the principle and agent of the agency led to the selection of agency theory. The notion that there is asymmetry in the information sharing between the principal and agent during the procurement process was made evident by the principal-agent theory, also known as the agency theory. The theory was first put forth by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) in connection with the study of insurance. They then adapted it to the social sciences to examine how knowledge asymmetry affected contracts and other human interactions. In the public procurement process, information access is asymmetrical for both the principal and the agent. The cost of a threshold or benchmark for a contract awarded is known to the procuring entity, and the agent is fully aware of the professional and technical capabilities of the contract for which they are applying. In public procurement procedures, officials are tasked with managing the transaction and awarding contracts for the principals and the public. These processes frequently result in the establishment of the government, with various contractors, manufacturers, or service providers acting as the agents.
The rewards are specified for each agent based on a certificate of no objections and their appointment letters. There are occasions when actors behave inconsistently with accepted norms, which frequently results in information asymmetry. When this happens, the established procedures are jeopardized because the agent prioritizes their interests over those of the principal. This leads to a prismatic system where the administrative system runs on the Bazaar-canteen syndrome (Riggs, 1964), creating anomalous circumstances that are common in public procurement procedures. Despite the specified procedures that are meant to be followed to guarantee that the agent acts in accordance with the principal's intended wishes, the system is vulnerable to several abuses. Theory puts the principle in a position to explain to the agent what it hopes to accomplish and how an agent would go about doing it. To uphold the norm of the highest good faith, the principal was to be informed of all the different acts or inactions of the agent. The principal-agent theory is essential to public procurement procedures in order to properly ensure value for money. The agency theory is essential to the contract award because of the fiduciary relationship between the contractors, who function as the agents, and the purchasing entities, which frequently represent the principal in public procurement procedures. According to the principal-agent theory, government or any of its MDAs' procurement discourse is appropriate when discussing value for money in public procurement procedures. In order to guarantee that contracts are executed as decided upon in the contract award process—which specifies the quality, quantity, time, place, and efficiency with fewer skirmishes-this highlights the essential relationship that exists between the principal and agent.
In order to discuss the methods and techniques used to achieve the paper's objective, the examination of the challenges faced by the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency through the use of descriptive data analysis technique, this section describes the methodology that was employed in the administration of questionnaires for this paper. The focus of the study was the operations of the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency, which is located in Lagos State, which is in the Western Region of Nigeria. Lagos State has 20 local government areas and 37 LCDAs, and because of its location-which includes the nation's largest seaport, which serves as a window to global economies-it has a plethora of economic activity.
For the ministries of Housing 110, Finance 89, Works and Infrastructure 240, and Justice 481, the study used a purposive sample technique. Planning and controlling, the two tiers of management, were taken into account because they participated actively in the procurement process. Additionally, the 100 employees of LSPPA in GL 07 to GL 17; the construction companies, comprising of their senior employees, were the respondents; these included the Messers First Investment Property Company (58), Planets Projects 64, Craneburg Construction Company 69, and Hitech Construction Company 70. The Civil Society Organization was represented by Coalition against Corrupt Leader 25, and Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability 32. Ymonitor 29; BudgIT 31. These construction businesses were chosen due to their extensive portfolio of completed projects in the state during the previous years for the two administrations that are being examined, as well as the current administration's participation with new ones. However, the civil society organizations were picked because, among other things, they promoted accountability, openness, and probity. In the final phase, 210 respondents, or 15% of the research population, were chosen for the sample size using a proportionate random selection procedure. In the meantime, questionnaires were sent to the 210 responders in order to guarantee that the article achieved the necessary validity and credibility. The percentage and impact analysis of the challenges by ranking of the mean calculated via SPSS, the Statistical Package for Social Scientists, were the statistical instruments used for data analysis in the paper. 15% was purposefully included in the study to guarantee that responders are distributed and used fairly. The third purpose of the major thesis was the paper title, which was taken from the key questionnaires used in the assessment of the implementation of public procurement policy in Lagos State.
Analysis and Interpretation of Data
Following the distribution of two hundred and ten (210) questionnaires to the respondents, two hundred and two (202) were retrieved. This suggested that the questionnaires that were distributed had a response rate of more than 96%. Two types of statistical analysis were performed on the generated quantitative data: inferential and descriptive.
The Public Procurement Agency in Lagos State Faces Difficulties in Putting Public Procurement Policy into Practice
This section included first-hand information on the difficulties the agency was having putting the public procurement policy into practice. The researcher employed a four-dimensional assessment scale, with the categories being highly substantial (4), substantial (3), less substantial (2), and insubstantial (1), to gather data from the participants regarding the significance of each stated challenge. In order to determine the direction of their responses, the scale was then divided into largely substantial and largely insubstantial categories. The mean was then computed in order to acknowledge the average impact, if any, of the challenges on the agency functions and powers in the implementation of public procurement policy, and the mean value was ranked accordingly. According to the mean criterion, an impact is considered insignificant if the mean value is 2.5 or below, and significant if it is 2.51 or more. The rating of 1, 2, 3, 4, summing divided by 4 was used to justify the adoption of a 2.5 average, meaning that 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 = 10/4; 2.5.
The research instrument's initial claim confirmed the interference as a threat to the agency's authority. According to the analysis's findings, 67.4% of respondents agreed that interference with the LSPPA's authority and functions presented a largely considerable challenge to the organization, while 32.6% of respondents refuted this assertion with largely insubstantial comments. The average score of 2.9 confirmed that interference had a significant average influence on the authority and capabilities of the agency. Given that interference was ranked second among the difficulties, it is likely capable of severely impairing the agency's capabilities and functions. It is sufficient to deduce from the percentage estimated and mean calculated that the second most difficult implementation challenge faced by LSPPA is interference from political office holders impeding agency functions.
The low ethical standard was viewed as a challenge as well. Given that 41.1% of respondents largely affirmed the significance of the claim, and that 58.9% of respondents acknowledged that the assertion was largely insubstantial, it is confirmed that the low ethical standard was also viewed as posing the least challenge to the LSPPA in the implementation of public procurement policy. The mean value of 2.5 further confirms that the low ethical standard has a largely insubstantial impact on agency activities. Out of the ten difficulties that were proposed, the poor ethical standard came in at number eight. It is sufficient to state that low moral standards present a challenge; yet, they do not constitute a huge constraint on the powers and functions of LSPPA.
With a mean value of 2.6 ranking seventh, which indicated that the ineffective oversight function had a largely substantial impact on the agency's activities, 63.9% of respondents largely confirmed the challenge that the ineffective oversight function posed to the LSPPA's activities, while 36.1% of respondents largely refuted the assertion. This conclusion indicated that the public procurement policy's implementation and its subsequent effects were hindered by the LSPPA's weak oversight function.
The agency's operations were severely hampered by the delayed appropriations budget, as indicated by the fact that 57.4% of respondents substantially affirmed the claim, while 42.6% of respondents claimed it was insubstantial. This claim was further supported by a mean value of 2.7, which is greater than the 2.5 yardstick, and it was therefore ranked 5.5th, confirming the significant impact the delayed appropriations budget had on agency operations and, consequently, on the State's public procurement policy's implementation.
The issue of a manpower shortage was also identified, and it was found that, with a mean value of 2.1 and a rank of 9.5th out of ten acknowledged challenges, and a mean value below the yardstick, the shortage of manpower had a largely insignificant impact on the agency's activities related to the implementation of the public procurement policy. With 72.2% of the responses, the respondents confirmed the claim that a lack of manpower did not present a problem to agency activities as insubstantial, while just 27.8% of the responses significantly supported the allegation. Although a barrier, the lack of people does not have the power to negatively impact agency operations or the state's implementation of public procurement policy.
The allegation that the agency's operations were hindered by a lack of political will and commitment to prosecute offenders was substantially supported by 54.5% of the respondents, while 45.5% agreed that the claim was largely unimportant. With a mean value of 2.7, higher than the cutoff of 2.5 and a tied ranking of 5.5th in the issues acknowledged, the assertion had a significant impact on the agency's operations and the subsequent outcome in the state's application of public procurement policy. It is sufficient to say that the Public Procurement Law's stipulations were not adhered to by the LSPPA, which presented a problem in terms of political will and determination to prosecute violators.
In order to demonstrate that the contract awarding process involved unethical behavior, the challenge of unethical practices was also confirmed. With 65.8% of respondents affirming the assertion's largely substantial impact on the agency's operations, compared to 34.2% who affirmed its largely insubstantial impact, the assertion's result was as follows: with a mean value of 2.8, this value tied for 3.5th place out of ten challenges that were acknowledged. This suggests that unethical contract awarding procedures have had a significant impact on the agency's operations, which has a knock-on effect on the state's public procurement policy's implementation.
Verified as a challenge to the agency's operations, politicized civil society organizations were found to have a significant impact on those operations, as evidenced by the 78.2% of respondents who strongly agreed with this assertion, compared to the negligible 21.8% of those who answered insignificantly. Of the ten challenges that were discovered, the mean value was 3.80, ranking first. Therefore, it is sufficient to conclude that the politicized civil society organizations had a troubling and damning effect on the agency's operations in carrying out the state's public procurement policy. Therefore, in order to confirm the accuracy of their reports and accusations as they relate to government, the thoughts and opinions of civil society organizations must frequently be carefully analyzed and examined.
Another issue with the agency's operations was confirmed to be the delay in the decision-making process regarding contract misconduct. The claim was found to be essentially insignificant, ranking 9.5th out of ten recognized challenges with a mean value of 2.1. In contrast to the number of generally substantial responses (34.2%), which was less than 50% that affirmed the claim, the percentage of primarily insubstantial responses (65.8%), or more than 50% of the responses, likewise affirmed the insubstantial nature of the claim. It is enough to conclude that the judicial process on the awarded contract has no appreciable impact on the powers and functions of LSPPA, even though the delay in the adjudication of contact malpractices caused an insignificant impediment to the organization's operations.
While 39.1% of respondents deemed the claim to be insignificant, 60.9% of respondents largely agreed with the argument that the agency's actions are hampered by delayed submission of procurement plans, which impacts the implementation of public procurement policy. The mean value of 2.8, which tied for 3.5th place out of the ten difficulties identified, confirmed the challenge's mostly severe impact on the agency's operations. As a result, the problem of procurement plans being submitted late has diminished the agency's operations, which in turn has weakened the state's ability to implement public procurement policies Table 1.
| Assertions | LAS f (% ) |
SUBS f (% ) |
LES f (% ) |
INSUB f (% ) |
x¯ | R |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The political office holders' meddling impedes the agency's operations. | 84 (41.6) | 52 (25.8) | 32 (15.8) | 34 (16.8) | 2.9 | 2nd |
| Inadequate moral standards prevent the execution of contracts. | 47 (23.3) | 36 (17.8) | 84 (41.6) | 35 (17.3) | 2.5 | 8th |
| The contracting process is impacted by an inefficient supervision function. | 44 (21.8) | 85 (42.1) | 19 (9.4) | 54 (26.7) | 2.6 | 7th |
| Agency's authority is hampered by the actual release of the approved budget being delayed. | 76 (37.6) | 40 (19.8) | 31 (15.3) | 55 (27.3) | 2.7 | 5.5th |
| Manpower shortage undermines the agency's ability to evaluate contracts | 29 (14.4) | 27 (13.4) | 76 (37.6) | 70 (34.6) | 2.1 | 9.5th |
| Lack of political will to bring criminal charges has an impact on the adjudicatory process. | 51 (25.2) | 59 (29.2) | 76 (37.6) | 16 (7.9) | 2.7 | 5.5th |
| Sharp contract awarding methods impede the procurement process. | 76 (37.6) | 57 (28.2) | 17 (8.4) | 52 (25.8) | 2.8 | 3.5th |
| Politicized civil society organizations impede agency operations | 76 (37.6) | 82 (40.6) | 11 (5.5) | 33 (16.3) | 3 | 1st |
| Agency authority is weakened by delays in the resolution of contract malpractice cases. | 46 (22.8) | 23 (11.4) | 50 (24.8) | 83 (41.0) | 2.1 | 9.5th |
| Agency authority is weakened by delays in the resolution of contract malpractice cases. | 73 (36.1) | 50 (24.8) | 38 (18.8) | 41 (20.3) | 2.8 | 3.5th |
This section included first-hand information on the difficulties the agency was having implementing the public procurement policy. The researcher used a four-dimensional assessment scale to get information from the respondents regarding the importance of each issue raised. In order to determine the direction of their responses, the scale was then divided into largely substantial and largely insubstantial categories. The mean was then calculated in order to recognize whether or not the challenges had a significant impact on the agency's functions and authority when implementing public procurement policy.
The first item on the research tool confirmed the interferences as a challenge to the agency's authority and role in carrying out the policy. According to the analysis's findings, 67.4% of respondents mainly agreed that interference was a significant problem to the agency, while 32.6% of respondents largely disagreed, calling the claim unfounded. The average score of 2.9 confirmed that interference had a significant impact on the authority and capabilities of the agency. Given that interference was ranked second among the difficulties, it is likely capable of severely impairing the agency's capabilities and functions. Okafor and Moebe (2005) and Omagbon (2016) provided evidence in support of the study's findings affirmed that one significant kind of political office holders' meddling that substantially hampered the execution of public procurement law and the organization that encourages compliance with it is godfatherism.
The low ethical standard was viewed as a challenge as well. While 41.1% of respondents mostly confirmed the claim as substantial, 58.9% of respondents stated that the claim was insubstantial. The agency's operations were mainly unaffected by low ethical standards, as indicated by the mean value of 2.5. Out of the ten difficulties that were proposed, the poor ethical standard came in at number eight. It is sufficient to state at this point that low ethical standards present a barrier, but they do not significantly hinder the agency's ability to carry out its duties in putting public procurement policy into practice.
While 36.1% of respondents mainly disagreed with the assertion, 63.9% of respondents largely agreed that the agency's operations were challenged by an inefficient oversight role. The agency's activities were significantly impacted by the ineffective supervision function, as demonstrated by the 7th-ranked mean score of 2.6. This outcome demonstrated how the agency's incompetent supervision function undermined the public procurement policy's execution and all of its consequences.
42.6% of respondents largely disagreed with the statement that the agency's operations were severely hampered by the delay in the allotted money, while 57.4% of respondents largely agreed. The agency activities were significantly impacted by the delayed appropriations budget, as evidenced by the tie-ranked 5.5th mean value, which further impacted the public procurement policy's execution.
With a mean value of 2.1 and a tie for 9.5th place among the ten challenges identified, the manpower shortage was also identified. It was found to have an insignificant impact on the agency's operations with regard to the implementation of the public procurement policy. With 72.2% of the respondents disagreeing with the premise that a lack of workers hampered agency operations, just a pitiful 27.8% of the respondents largely agreed with the assertion. Even while there is a labor shortage, it is not severe enough to hinder agency operations when it comes to putting the Lagos public procurement strategy into practice.
While 45.5% of respondents mainly disagreed with the statement, 54.5% of respondents primarily agreed that the agency's operations are challenged by the significant influence of a lack of political will and commitment to punish offenders. With a mean value of 2.7 and a ranking of 5.5th among the obstacles admitted, the assertion had a significant impact on the agency's operations and the outcome in the state's application of public procurement policy.
In order to demonstrate that the contract awarding process involved unethical behavior, the challenge of unethical practices was also confirmed. The assertion's result demonstrated that the agency's operations were significantly impacted by the cutting-edge contract awarding practices, as evidenced by the 65.8% of respondents who largely agreed and the 34.2% who largely disagreed. The mean value of the assertion was 2.8, placing it 3.5th out of ten acknowledged challenges. This suggests that unfair contract awarding procedures have had a significant negative impact on the agency's operations, which in turn has had an impact on how the state's public procurement policy is implemented.
It was determined that politicized civil society organizations had a largely substantial impact on agency activities after they were verified as a challenge to the agency's operations. This finding was supported by 78.2% of the responses, compared to an extremely small 21.8% of the largely insubstantial negation responses. With a mean rating of 3.0, it was the highest of the 10 acknowledged challenges. Therefore, it is sufficient to conclude that politicized civil society organizations had a troubling and devastating effect on the agency's operations when it came to implementing public procurement legislation in the state of Lagos. Therefore, in order to confirm the accuracy of their reports and accusations as they relate to government spending, the thoughts and opinions of civil society organizations must frequently be carefully analyzed and scrutinized.
Another issue with the agency's operations was confirmed to be the delay in the decision-making process regarding contract misconduct. The allegation was found to be essentially insignificant, ranking 9.5th out of the ten acknowledged challenges, with a mean value of 2.1. Comparing the proportion of mainly agreement (34.2%), which was less than 50% that verified the claim, to the percentage of largely disagreement (65.8%), which was more than 50% of the benchmark and further confirmed the claim's insubstantial nature. Even if the delay in the contact malpractice adjudication process presented a relatively little challenge, it is nonetheless a challenge that needs to be investigated to guarantee the proper execution of the agency's operations.
In contrast to 39.1% of respondents who said the claim was mainly insubstantial, 60.9% of respondents largely supported the assertion that the agency's actions are hampered by late submission of procurement plans, which impacts the implementation of public procurement policy.
The mean score of 2.8, tied for 3.5th place out of the ten difficulties identified, confirmed the challenge's mostly severe impact on the agency's operations. As a result, the problem of late submission of procurement plans has diminished the agency's operations, which in turn has weakened the state of Lagos's execution of public procurement policy.
The study came to the conclusion that, in order to guarantee that the public procurement policy implementation in Lagos State achieved its intended objectives, the majority of the acknowledged challenges faced by the agency could be effectively addressed. These challenges are socially, politically, and economically created. The analysis also demonstrated that, thanks to the LSPPA's adoption of a number of tactics, the policy goal of efficiency, probity, and transparency across the many procuring bodies is mostly being met.
Seven of the ten challenges identified affirmed the significant impact of the challenges faced by the Lagos State Public Procurement Agency (LSPPA). It was clear from the assertions tested that the challenges faced by the LSPPA in the state's implementation of public procurement law are substantial and occasionally impede its powers and functions as outlined in the public procurement law of the state. The goals of the agency must be free from all interference in order to strengthen the LSPPA's operations and functions. This will improve the state's procurement procedures' efficiency, probity, transparency, openness, and value for money.
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Citation: Adewoyin AW (2024). The Lagos State Public Procurement Agency's Problems with the Lagos State Public Procurement Law's Implementation. JRIBM. 11: 030.